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Two narratives have emerged to describe recent healthcare reforms in the United States of America (US) and the United Kingdom (UK). One narrative speaks of revolution, 1 that the adoptions of the Affordable Care Act 2010 (ACA) in the US, and the Health and Social Care
Act 2012 (HSCA) in the UK, have resulted in fundamental, large-scale philosophical, political and legal change in the jurisdictions' respective healthcare systems. 2 The other narrative evokes evolution, 3 identifying each new legislative scheme as a natural development of existing governance structures. 4 Policymakers in both the US and UK face the problem of a healthcare system which, as traditionally envisaged, cannot offer universal access to healthcare at a reasonable, or politically acceptable, price. 5 In an attempt to solve this problem, policymakers shop around, with the result that each of the two jurisdictions' reformed healthcare system includes features normally associated with a free market healthcare model, as this has been seen to increase quality and lower costs, but both also demonstrate characteristics of a state run model, which provides a safety net for citizens and a buffer against the commodification of health.
Here, we argue that neither the revolutionary nor the evolutionary narrative adequately characterizes these policy initiatives since, although each jurisdiction has effected significant change, neither has detached its reformed healthcare system from the moorings of its traditional healthcare model and neither takes adequate account of the broader settings in which those reforms have occurred. 6 The narrative of revolution pays insufficient attention to party politics and the extremes of partisan rhetoric, and lacks a considered exposition of the political bargaining behind reform and the crafting of legislation intended to balance past and future manifestations of a healthcare system. On the other hand, we are skeptical of the evolutionary narrative, based on its claim that the 'new' systems are typologically consistent with their predecessors, which misrepresents the reforms' extent. The introduction of the individual mandate requiring individuals to purchase healthcare insurance in the US, 7 and the marketization of the National Health Service (NHS) in the UK, 8 pushes each system into previously uncharted territory, namely the middle ground between free market and government run (social insurance) healthcare. 9 Forced to choose, for reasons which will become apparent we would dismiss the revolutionary narrative in favour of its evolutionary counterpart. We do, however, consider the evolutionary narrative too narrowly focussed and insular.
In seeking to examine and explain the jurisdictions' apparent drive to the middle, we propose a distinctive evolutionary narrative, that of convergence, which, as well as adopting a less parochial perspective on developments in healthcare policy, also situates the reforms politically, constitutionally and comparatively. The idea of convergence in relation to healthcare systems is not, in itself, unusual or unknown. Wendt et al. note, for example, a "tendency of convergence from distinct types towards mixed types of healthcare systems" 10 occurring in the two jurisdictions. Convergence does not have to be purposeful or coordinated since the emergence of similar characteristics in healthcare systems, or any system, may occur entirely independently. 11 To illustrate why convergence better describes healthcare reform in the UK and the US, we will explore the reforms' interaction with each jurisdiction's fundamental political principles, as expressed in their respective constitutions. 12 Constitutions have played a crucial role in both jurisdictions. By policing the revolutionary elements of reform, they guarantee that policymakers have not overlooked fundamental political principles, 13 while ensuring that political opponents do not dismantle reform so as to render it merely, and mildly, evolutionary.
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Roadmap
To substantiate the idea of convergence this paper is divided into three parts. Part One demonstrates that, where superficial analysis of healthcare politics in the US and the UK might indicate that this paper's proposed thesis of convergence is outlandish, deeper inquiry demonstrates otherwise. The revolutionary narrative is revealed as a false reality, built upon an over-reliance on the observation of formal voting patterns and unquestioning acceptance of extreme political rhetoric as truth. Looking behind this representation of the reform process, the positions of independent politicians and intra-party concessions of extreme positions, for example, indicate that healthcare politics has been far more subtly conducted than the idea of revolution suggests. To suggest that 'revolution' has taken place in either jurisdiction thus overplays the form and rhetoric of healthcare politics at the expense of the nuance, bargaining and balance that underpin its reality.
In Part Two, we analyse the narrative of evolution. This analysis drives us towards the conclusion that evolution insufficiently reflects the nature of the change brought about by the ACA and HSCA. Aspects of both jurisdictions' reformed systems are impossible to reconcile with their traditional model of healthcare and, therefore, the idea of linear evolution does not truly explain what has occurred. Policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic have incorporated elements of the other's system, meaning that neither reformed system can truly be considered a direct, transformational evolution of the pre-existing regime. Given the apparent failures of liability if they do not provide health insurance for their workers. Thirdly, insurance is expanded, and significant numbers of low and middle income earners brought within its scope, via the 'Health Insurance Marketplace', a federal or state-administered, regulated, online facility where citizens and small businesses can see, compare and purchase private health plans and, provided that they qualify, receive federal assistance with premium costs.
The ACA also introduced the individual mandate, which requires Americans to maintain "minimum essential" health insurance coverage. In particular, those not covered via their employer or government must meet the requirement by purchasing insurance privately. Noncompliance with the mandate attracts a penalty, to be paid to the Internal Revenue Service.
Finally, providers of private health insurance may not refuse or limit coverage on the basis of existing or predicted health conditions and, whilst they may vary their rates by age, insurers may not take account of past or predicted future use of health services. The ACA thus introduces more government regulation into American healthcare via the expansion of social insurance.
Leflar describes the reform arena as being characterised by "polarized ideology, complex and brutal politics, [and] perverse economics." 32 Alongside the academic community, policymakers have made strong rhetorical statements about the revolutionary nature of healthcare reform. Opposition politicians in the UK stress the future dominance of free market principles in the NHS, 33 whereas in the US political criticism focuses upon how reform will increase state involvement in healthcare. 34 Critics declare that the reforms selected fit better with philosophical concepts regarded as alien to the model of healthcare to which they are accustomed and attached and, more fundamentally, alien to the principles and values that underpin their jurisdiction's political landscape. 35 The use of these alien philosophical concepts is an attempt to expose reform as underpinned by foreign values, which are orthogonal to the host's. Most often, the rhetoric is loaded and is an expression of pure ideological caricature lodged at the extremes of an untrammelled free market, 36 or a fully centralised socialist system, 37 or perhaps reversion to some less desirable point in history. 38 Ideologues on both sides appear entrenched in their refusal to acknowledge the compromises that emerge from the "wide and fertile space between Utopia and
Armageddon" 39 where, in reality, healthcare reform is worked out. As a result, accounts of healthcare reform confuse and undermine reasonable and legitimate political dispute and debate.
Reform is also a response to empirical fact; healthcare in both the US and the UK is unaffordable. In the US, healthcare accounts for 17.9% of GDP. 40 Moreover, pre-ACA 16.3% of the US population did not have health insurance 41 and, consequently, was unable to access the market. Meanwhile, in the UK, spending on the NHS accounted for 18% of the 2013 government budget, at roughly £139 billion. 42 It is only appropriate, therefore, in an economic climate in which government coffers are running low, that policymakers should look to reform healthcare and acknowledge that there is nothing inevitably symbiotic about reform and revolution.
The Revolutionary Narrative as Represented in Legislative Voting Patterns.
In the UK, Lieberman's vote would, thus, make reform easier to achieve, giving him significant bargaining capacity and a key role in producing a more moderate healthcare reform programme. 63 Lieberman opposed the idea of a public option within the ACA. 64 A public option would have introduced a government-controlled health insurance package, operating in direct competition with the private insurance market. 65 Shapiro observes that Lieberman "killed the public option" 66 by his refusal to block a filibuster if Democrats included a government run healthcare option within the ACA. To gain Lieberman's support overall, Democrats had to drop the public option from the ACA, thereby tempering one of its more radical provisions.
As Kang has identified, Lieberman's threat was clear, and present: "Lieberman [has] made regular practice of siding with Republicans on high-profile concerns, including the failed filibuster of Justice Samuel Alito's nomination, the Terri Schiavo controversy, and Bush's Social Security privatization proposals, among others" 67 all of which signify that the Democrats had to take Lieberman seriously as "holding Barack Obama to ransom" 68 over the public option. Lieberman has been declared "crucial" 69 and "essential" 70 not only to mustering the 60 votes necessary to defeat Republican filibusters but also to careful reform by terminating any, revolutionary, public option.
Reconsidering the Revolutionary Narrative 2:Party Members
Within the US and UK's governing parties, the political bargaining that occurred to produce legislation capable of carrying enough support to reach the statute books also provides evidence of how reform is not revolutionary. Bargaining was most apparent, and most necessary, in the UK, where the government comprised a coalition of Conservatives and Liberal Democrats. 71 Political bargaining in the US was more subtle, manifesting in modifications made by President Obama to appease and satisfy the demands of numerically strong southern, conservative Democrats without whose support in Congress the reforms would not have been written into law. 72 What is clear is that, in both jurisdictions, reformers were coaxed into modifying their proposed programmes -by dropping the more controversial components -in order to give them a more consensual appeal within their party.
The Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition has governed Britain since May 2010. Whilst overlaps in the parties' political ideologies exist, making coalition viable, this is not the case in the realm of healthcare. The easiest way to appreciate the marked difference between the parties' approaches to healthcare governance is via brief analysis of their 2010 election manifestoes. Whilst there was no desire to dismantle the nationalised system, the Conservative Party sought healthcare founded on "decentralise[d] power … real choice… doctors and nurses accountable to patients, not to endless layers of bureaucracy and management… that puts targets before patients." 73 Its manifesto stated that, if elected, it would "give patients more choice and free health professionals from the tangle of politicallymotivated targets that get in the way of providing the best care." 74 From the Conservative perspective, central to reforming the NHS was the introduction of a more 'fully-fledged' free market, with the ideas of freedom, choice, and entrepreneurship at the heart of that vision.
Had the HSCA been a piece of legislation passed by a purely Conservative government, it is likely that its free market principles would have been stronger but its coalition partner put the brakes on. 75 A key difference between the Liberal Democrat's manifesto and the Conservative Party's is a shift in language, away from freedom and choice, and towards "fairness" and "democracy". 76 The Liberal Democrats stress that the NHS, being "built on the basic British principle of fairness" 77 had, at its core, the idea of citizen empowerment rather than fiscal savings. While it could be argued that the two manifestoes arrive at the same conclusion, namely a more decentralised and people-driven health service, the means employed to achieve that end The Liberal Democrats are proud of how their role in coalition government softened the free market principles embedded in the HSCA. 79 In fact, to highlight the moderation of the Conservatives on the free market, the Liberal Democrats published a list of their achievements in relation to the HSCA:
"We have… (1) enshrined stronger duties on healthcare bodies to promote the integration of health and social care and to tackle health inequalities… (2) made sure that competition in the health service will be based on quality of care and not on price… (3) guaranteed that … any profit from private patients will be used to improve services for NHS patients… (4) preserved the Secretary of State's legal and political responsibility to maintain a universal comprehensive health service." 80 Another way in which the Liberal Democrats motivated mindful reform was through the establishment of the NHS Future Forum, 81 a large-scale government listening exercise that sought out professional, patient and public opinion and which, in an unprecedented hiatus, occurred mid-way through the legislative passage of the HSCA. 82 Through this listening exercise, which provided evidence of levels of public support, the Liberal Democrats managed to achieve a raft of changes to the Bill relating to the new NHS's structure, 83 its regulation, 84 the extent of its privatisation, 85 its emphasis on social care, 86 the creation of a more democratic and decentralised service, 87 and the shoring up of the Secretary of State's constitutional responsibility for the health service. 88 The interaction between the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats during the reforms' development demonstrates that the HSCA is not as revolutionary as some politicians suggest.
Firstly, through both parties having approached reform from different ideological positions, the HSCA blends the Conservative commitment to the free market with Liberal Democrat fidelity to fairness and democracy. Secondly, the reforms' faltering legislative passage demonstrates the reality of the pulling and hauling that occurs in the reconciliation of the parties' antithetical tendencies. Thirdly, so successful was the Liberal Democrat assault on the marketisation of the NHS that the party made a point of visibly indicating its ameliorating influence on the excesses of the proposed reforms. President Obama was required to craft a package of reforms that would gain the support of the more conservative, and typically southern, members of his own party. Blue Dog Democrats are "conservative". 95 It is their mission to bring a "common sense, bridge building … to forge middle ground bipartisan answers to challenges facing the country." 96 In the 111th Congress, the Blue Dog Caucus made two demands of the ACA.
Firstly, it must be cost neutral and, secondly, government involvement in healthcare regulation had to be minimised. 97 Jacobs and Skocpol believe that when the House and Senate voted on their final healthcare reform packages, concessions to Blue Dog Democrats emerged in both pieces of legislation. 98 For example, when the House passed its final bill it included a watered down public option and a unified national insurance exchange. 99 The restriction of abortion services under the ACA is a further key example of a Blue Dog concession. 100 Senator Ben Nelson, the most conservative of Democrats, threatened to withdraw his support for the ACA if it provided federal funding for abortion. 101 Nelson and the Obama Administration managed to negotiate a compromise position: the ACA does not require that insurance plans fund abortion and states may pass laws preventing plans included within the state controlled exchange scheme from including abortion. 102 The result is that no federal government money will be spent on abortion and states have the ability to opt out of promoting insurance plans that include abortion services. This was a genuine compromise, as
Ben Nelson had previously supported the House's Stupak-Pitts Amendment, which would have introduced a more pro-life emphasis to the ACA. 103 The most compelling evidence of concession to Blue Dog Democrats, and of the moderate nature of the ACA, is that, even with the Democrats in overall control of government, Obama did not attempt to create an ambitious project like Hillarycare. 104 Moreover, the eventual omission of even a public option indicates the ACA's relative conservatism. 105 Whilst we noted that, with his threatened refusal to prevent a Republican filibuster, Senator Joe Lieberman played a large role in killing off the public choice provision, Blackman highlights the distaste for the public option across the whole Democratic Party. 106 Progressive Democrats could not wholeheartedly support it because it was not radical enough, whilst conservative Democrats could not countenance further government involvement in the regulation of healthcare. As a result, the regulatory framework that ultimately emerged was heavily moderated by the requirement that any reform package crafted by President Obama must carry the support of his own party.
Evidently, the reaction of independents, and the way in which each jurisdiction's governing party had to fight to gain the support of those within its own ranks, undermines the claim that the US and UK's recent healthcare reforms are revolutionary. The dominance of the revolutionary narrative has not merely been limited to the number of legislative positions taken, however, since it extends to the magnitude of qualitative rhetoric used in opposition to reform. A second significant problem with the revolutionary narrative is that it focuses too heavily on politicians' partisan rhetoric, particularly in interpreting opponents' proposed reforms as radical. Inevitably, any shift in the structure of healthcare governance will result in strong political opposition but reform needs to be viewed through a more refractive lens. In any pluralistic society, including the US and UK, change is normally of degree, readjusting how healthcare replicates society's understanding of justice, equality, individualism, and collectivism.
Use of the Other in revolutionary discourse
Here are two typical examples of the use of The Other in debate;
"It is unfortunate that much of the campaign we have experienced has relied on convincing the public that the NHS is set to be privatised. In the US, opponents of the ACA claim that it offends liberty for conflicting reasons. They contend that, through commandeering people into purchasing health insurance, the ACA limits an individual's liberty by denying them the choice to forgo joining the market. 133 Judge
Vinson, in the Northern Florida District Court, summed up this interpretation of liberty, when he claimed that;
"It is difficult to imagine that a nation which began, at least in part, as the result of opposition to a British mandate giving the East India Company a monopoly and imposing a nominal tax on all tea sold in America would have set out to create a government with the power to force people to buy tea in the first place." 134 Of course, the presentation of these caricature versions of The Other could be easily dismissed, were it not for the fact that even proponents of reform were in on the act. For example, Earl Howe, the government minister for the HSCA in the House of Lords, noted with interest the common concern that the HSCA could lead to an "American-style market free-for-all, with competition harming patients' interests" 135 The fact that proponents of reform deem it necessary to differentiate between their system and the other jurisdiction's is evidence of a shared belief, across the political spectrum, in ideological differences between the two. When assessing the credibility of reform, proponents, rather than point out the virtues of the other system, tried distinguishing their reforms from the other's system. In order to sell reform, proponents clarified how changes maintained their system of healthcare, while cherry picking elements of The Other to reinforce their own. Proponents were never willing to accept that reform resulted in fundamental departure, nor did they go so far as to recognise that reform inevitably led to the possibility of convergence between the two systems.
Dismissing the Rhetoric of the Other and Considering Evolution
Revolutionary rhetoric seems disingenuous when it is considered that current opponents of particular reforms have, at one point or another, been the proponents of similar reforms.
Political rhetoric should be dismissed as just that, political. It is partly because opponents of reform, through their previously held political convictions, have supported similar reforms, 138 that we also dismiss the revolutionary narrative in favour of evolution.
In the US, for example, the individual mandate's provenance is as a Republican, conservative think-tank led policy. 139 Blackman states that former Republican Speaker of the House, Newt
Gingrich, supported an individual mandate to purchase health insurance up until May 2011. 140 The scheme was originally proposed by the Heritage Foundation to the Republican Party in 1993 as a free market alternative to Hillarycare. 141 Supporters of the individual mandate within the Republican Party, would, however, "throw consistency to the wind in their pursuit of partisan gains" 142 once the Democrats proposed a healthcare system based on an individual mandate in 2008. 143 Moreover, and federalism arguments aside, 144 the only such scheme adopted at state level in the US has been that of Massachusetts' Republican Governor, Mitt Romney. 145 It, therefore, seems impossible to accept the claim that the individual mandate is revolutionary and an 'unprecedented' socialisation of healthcare. Quite the opposite, with both parties having supported it, the introduction of the individual mandate seems like a natural evolution.
Similarly, in the UK, opening the NHS to free market principles has been a goal not merely 150 Secondly, it created Monitor, which ensures that the NHS remains competitive. It seems unlikely that, with the Conservatives now at the helm as the coalition's majority party, this drive will change. 151 The Labour Party's 2010 general election manifesto had, in any case, promised to "expand patient choice, empowering patients with information, and giving individuals the right to determine the time and place of treatment." 152 Consequently, the Labour Party's track record in government, combined with its manifesto commitment to competition, evokes the disingenuity of the Republican's switch.
What has become apparent is that policymakers in the US and UK no longer see a largely free market system or completely state controlled system as capable of solving healthcare regulation's principal dilemma, controlling the cost of health while ensuring universal levels of coverage. 153 Policymakers have instead mixed aspects of internal system evolution with the inclusion of revolutionary transplants 154 from the other's system. In pursuit of equilibrium, they have introduced concepts conventionally conceived as abrasive to their own constitutional order. As a result of seeking to tackle the same problem, policymakers in the US and the UK have moved towards establishing two ideologically similar healthcare
systems, yet it is important to note that the two systems remain substantially different because, whilst they are moving closer ideologically, they began at opposite ends of the spectrum.
Evolution does not, however, fully convey what is occurring here because it does not describe the direction of reform. What is interesting is that both jurisdictions' chosen path of evolution is towards The Other. In both jurisdictions evolution is convergent, moving towards the same -middle -ground. In light of this, we agree with Glennerster and Lieberman's contention that, while The Other's healthcare system may be viewed as a "curiosity at best and an abomination at worst" 155 there are, in fact, fewer differences between the two than ever before. What has occurred is evolution, so much so that it could be argued to amount to "hidden" convergence. 156 Behind this notion is what Glennerster and Lieberman perceive as a reverse flow of ideas, meaning that while the two systems took remarkably different forms after the Second World War, since then piecemeal policy changes have been informed and underpinned by the successes of The Other. 157 "Powerful forces" such as "economic, political, and demographic challenges… have bent these apparently opposite systems" 158 to
The Other's shape.
There is one aspect neglected in Glennerster and Lieberman's study which is the role played by constitutions and constitutional law in this process. We contend that constitutional actors, including constitutions themselves, have, and will continue to, play a key role in evolutionary convergence. Constitutional law has provided a necessary and principled buffer, preventing reformers from engaging in outright revolution. The presence of this buffer is imperative in healthcare reform because policymakers do not know the middle ground for which they search. On neither side of the Atlantic can politicians profess to have the solution to providing universal access to healthcare whilst maintaining the financial viability of the healthcare system. Evolutionary convergence is, therefore, blind and the quest for equilibrium likely to take many twists and turns.
Constitutions and constitutional law have a role to play in policing this search. A constitution is, after all, our "plan for politics" 159 and all policy choices must be made in the context of this plan. If a policy choice conflicts with the plan, either the policy must be altered or the constitution amended. In this sense it is a primary task of a constitution to act as a roadblock to potentially revolutionary policy. 160 We will demonstrate through consideration of the Supreme Court of the United States 
Part 3: Constitutional Law as Balancer
We have argued elsewhere that the US and UK's healthcare reforms do not necessarily 'fit'
(to varying degrees) their respective constitutions. 163 The argument goes that the reforms' constitutional fit has been rationalised post-hoc, and that policymakers did not sufficiently consider constitutional mores when drafting reform legislation. While we do not believe that reformers paid sufficient attention to the constitutional dimension when crafting new healthcare systems, we see that, post-reform, constitutions and constitutional law have taken centre stage. Proponents and opponents of reform have sought to confirm or cast off parts of the new system on the basis of compatibility with the jurisdiction's underlying political philosophy, as represented in its constitution, or 'plan for politics'. 164 As plans for politics, constitutions capture the framework commitments and values of a society, setting the ground rules for future generations. Constitutions, while largely ill-considered in the creation of these systems, have played a significant role in setting, revising and policing the boundaries of reform.
Rethinking the Supreme Court's Judgment in National Federation of Independent Business v Sebelius
In NFIB the Attorney Generals of 27 state governments, 165 NFIB (a non-profit organisation, representing over 350,000 small businesses), a variety of academics, pressure groups and right leaning policy units, in 81 amicus briefs, petitioned SCOTUS to declare the ACA unconstitutional. Their primary contention was that the ACA's constitutionality rested upon
Congress being granted powers "unprecedented and unbounded" 166 under the American Constitution.
Two provisions within the ACA shaped the oppositions' cases. Firstly, the mandate that all individuals must purchase healthcare insurance rested upon the allegedly questionable assumption that Article 1 powers provided Congress with the authority to make that demand. 167 Secondly, the withdrawal of funding from States for refusing to accept the enlarged Medicaid state-funded health insurance scheme under the ACA was argued to contradict South Dakota v Dole, 168 which sought to limit Congress's spending power for the purposes of maintaining America's federal structure of government. 169 If SCOTUS agreed, opponents invited a ruling that would hold the whole of the ACA unconstitutional on the basis that it would be impossible to sever these elements and for the Act to work. 170 At their core, these arguments assert that the ACA undercut American federalism by granting institutions of the federal government powers in excess of those "few" and "defined" powers granted within the Constitution. 171 While SCOTUS in NFIB did not hand opponents the victory they wanted, its ruling was not entirely favourable to the federal government either. In fact, the SCOTUS judgment has gone a long way to ensuring the ACA's ideological conformity. 172 That is, the SCOTUS decision has made the ACA less antagonistic to the American concept of liberty than it had been prior to the judgment. 173 Right leaning libertarian Professor Randy Barnett contends that "we lost on healthcare. But the Constitution won" 174 , though a more moderate conclusion might be that post-NFIB the ACA comports better with the Constitution's commitment to liberty.
An example of this toning down comes in the SCOTUS's answer to the first question, Consequently, rooting the individual mandate's constitutionality within the Taxing power makes the ACA less revolutionary within America's constitutional structure. By resting its legality on the taxing power, SCOTUS reduced the ACA's coercive strength, 178 meaning that the individual mandate was no longer a command from the federal government to purchase healthcare insurance but, depending one's perspective, either a tax break for those who do, or a tax on those who do not. The SCOTUS decision, to a lesser degree, undercut the Constitution's federal division of powers by framing the individual mandate as within a power which, it claimed, Congress always had. 179 The NFIB judgment should thus be seen as a decision that balances the legitimate need to find a solution to the healthcare dilemma of cost versus access against the equally legitimate need to protect values central to the Constitution.
Rivkin, Casey and Grossman have dismissed NFIB as " fig-leaf federalism", which is "long on principles and platitudes but short on enforcement". 180 We 191 These Justices believed the coercive element to be essential to the Medicaid expansion and thus refused to sever s1396c from the rest of the ACA. This is a far more radical position than that adopted by Chief Justice Roberts. 192 In merely striking down s1396c the rest of the statute was saved, upholding the constitutionality of the majority of the ACA, which was not constitutionally abrasive, while reframing and striking down those elements which were.
The House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution and Ministerial
Responsibility
In the UK, constitutional concerns over the HSCA have also led to modification. A major difference to note is in that the UK's forum for constitutional amendment has, thus far, been the legislature rather than the judiciary. Unlike in the US, where the SC settled the policy initiative-constitutional fidelity equilibrium, in the UK the House of Lords in its legislative capacity performed this task. 193 The cause of this institutional shift is the departure from 198 Decisions concerning the spending of public money, raised through taxation, would be devoid of any political control or repercussions if that democratic linkage was not maintained. 199 Severing ministerial accountability from the NHS would create a constitutional black hole. Furthermore, the legitimacy of the British constitution rests upon the notion that Parliament is omnipotent, and its decisions democratically legitimate, because it is the only branch of government that is representative of the people. Voicing its concern over these changes, the HLCC stated;
"The combination of these changes matters, constitutionally, because it is not clear whether the existing structures of political and legal accountability with regard to the NHS will continue to operate as they have done hitherto if the Bill is passed in its current form. As such, the House will wish carefully to consider whether these changes pose an undue risk either that individual ministerial responsibility to Parliament will be diluted or that legal accountability to the courts will be fragmented." The result of this is that the free market accountability structure the government aimed to install by "giving CCGs the confidence to act as market players, free from the fear of ministerial 'interference'" 205 has been diminished, ensuring that Parliament maintains control over the executive, and democratic accountability still counts, even in a marketised NHS. In this regard, the HLCC used the constitution to remove the most revolutionary aspect of the HSCA, the placing of large sections of the publicly funded healthcare service beyond democratic oversight. Like SCOTUS, the HLCC did not condemn the reforms outright on the basis of constitutional problems. Rather than recommend wholesale overhaul, the HLCC, like SCOTUS, demanded the excision of the most revolutionary elements of reform, whilst upholding the rest.
Policymakers in the US and UK have proceeded to mix aspects of internal system evolution with the inclusion of revolutionary concepts imported and adapted from the other's system. In search of healthcare equilibrium, they have introduced notions conventionally conceived as abrasive to their own constitutional order. As a result, we conclude that the healthcare systems of the US and UK are converging on the same ground.
There is another species of equilibrium that must be attained or maintained, however, and that is constitutional equilibrium. In that sense, the actions of both SCOTUS and the HLCC are testament to the idea of evolution as opposed to revolution, bringing the necessary constitutional perspective, and balance, to the politics of healthcare. That is to say that each jurisdiction's healthcare system, despite the inclusion of some conceivably contradictory or alien concepts on the face of it, is enabled to comport with its plan for politics through the constitution's role as a mechanism for sustaining commitment to certain ideological values and ensuring evolution rather than revolution.
Conclusion
This paper takes no position on the jurisdictions' reforms, neither agreeing nor disagreeing with opponents or proponents of the respective healthcare systems. It recognizes that healthcare reform is as much about practical politics as it is about principle. In that context, it finds the evolutionary narrative more persuasive than the revolutionary, which manifests practical politics to the detriment of principle, albeit that, in that revolutionary narrative, practical politics masquerades as an overweening commitment to principle. It also finds that the healthcare systems of the UK and US are not as different as the revolutionary narrative's depiction of the political positions suggests. There is convergence, an external fact that the evolutionary narrative is more able to account for along with its depiction of internal change.
At the heart of our convergence narrative is how, in order to maintain internal constitutional fidelity, reform has been tempered post-hoc by constitutional actors. Firstly, constitutional adjudication has moulded the outer limits of reform, revising or reversing those parts of the new healthcare systems perceived to be (too) revolutionary. 206 When measured against fundamental political principles, as manifested by the constitution, some elements of the reforms have been confirmed as fitting within the constitutions' frameworks, others have not.
Secondly, through entertaining questions of constitutionality, and supporting certain elements of new healthcare systems, constitutional actors implicitly undermine the evolutionary narrative. Convergence enables us to embrace and account for change that is more than moderate, linear evolution but which falls short of revolution due to the presence of mechanisms of restraint. Whilst we identify convergence as an important outcome of independently undertaken healthcare reform, that convergence is, we conclude, blind. In neither jurisdiction do policymakers know the precise equilibrium between free market and state support that will achieve universal access at the lowest cost. Nor can they envisage what overall shape the converged healthcare system will ultimately take.
